Akashma Online News

by Marivel Guzman | Akashma News

September 12, 2025

✨ This section builds the skeleton: transport-level encryption, metadata exposure, endpoint compromise.

1. Encryption Without Anonymity

HTTPS does one job well: it encrypts the stream of data between your browser and a server. A hacker on the same café WiFi cannot see the words you type or the article you load. But encryption is not anonymity. Your ISP, and by extension state agencies, still know that you connected to akashmanew.com. They may not see which article you read, but they know you were there. For intelligence contractors, this “metadata” is more than enough. Snowden’s leaks showed us that governments didn’t need to read every email — knowing who contacted whom and when was already gold.

3. Endpoints: Where Encryption Never Reaches

Even the strongest lock is useless if someone watches over your shoulder. Pegasus spyware, and countless less famous siblings, operate at this level. They infect the phone or computer itself, capturing messages before they are encrypted and after they are decrypted. Screenshots, keystrokes, microphone activations — the spyware turns the device into an open book. HTTPS cannot touch this. This is why journalists, activists, and even heads of state have fallen victim: the illusion of privacy evaporates when the compromise begins at the source.

Key Sources

Glenn Greenwald — journalist who worked directly with Snowden and Poitras on the NSA leaks.

Laura Poitras — filmmaker & journalist, co‐recipient of the Snowden documents.

Snowden’s interviews, excerpts in No Place to Hide (Greenwald’s book) and in primary Guardian/Wired/Vanity Fair reporting.

1. “Encryption in transit vs metadata visible”

Snowden said NSA was collecting vast amounts of metadata on US citizens without warrant or specific suspicion.

The Boundless Informant tool (leaked by Snowden) visualized how NSA counted metadata globally — clearly showing metadata was collected and analyzed.



2. “Device compromise (endpoints) & opsec measures Snowden/Poitas/Greenwald took”

In Wired’s “Edward Snowden: The Untold Story,” Snowden describes removing batteries from phones, being cautious about location, being aware of techniques for surveillance.

In Citizenfour (Poitas/Greenwald) and the Vanity Fair “Shadowland of Secrets” article: Snowden communicating via encrypted channels, choosing to meet in Hong Kong, using security‐aware practices.



3. “Greenwald, Poitras have full archives / media roles”

Laura Poitras is one of the initial journalists to receive Snowden’s documents, along with Greenwald. They have said they hold full archives.

The book No Place to Hide by Greenwald details many of the programs revealed and discusses the leaks based on those documents.

What Isn’t Fully Supported (Caveats)

To keep things precise and avoid overclaiming:

“No one can snoop what article they’re reading” is too strong; these sources show metadata is visible and location information can leak through endpoints or device compromise. The sources do not claim HTTPS stops state‐level mass surveillance or endpoint spying.

Snowden’s own statements acknowledge there are trade‐offs, limitations. For example, in his interviews, he said you cannot have perfect security and perfect convenience.

There is no verified public documentation (from Greenwald/Poitras/Snowden) that HTTPS alone stops all forms of surveillance (especially advanced spyware like Pegasus). These claims are inference or extrapolation based on understanding of how technology works, not direct claims in the Snowden archive.

Read the Introduction to The Illusion of Privacy Series

The Role of Independent Thinkers