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From Gilad Shalit to Gaza: What Changed in the Value of a Captive?


By Marivel Guzman | Akashma News

Based in part on Reuters reporting from October 2011, with updated reporting and analysis.


Days before the 2011 prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, then the Hamas leader governing Gaza, said Palestinians had paid a “dear price” to secure the release of prisoners held by Israel.

“Our people today will harvest the fruit of one destination of Jihad and steadfastness,” Haniyeh told worshipers before Friday prayers in Gaza City on Oct. 14, 2011.

“Gaza has paid a dear price of blood and martyrs and agonies in actions the occupation had carried under the slogan of freeing Shalit,” he said.

“The great Palestinian people paid all that price in order to free the prisoners because we believe that the value of man is derived from the value of the homeland.”

The quotations appeared in a Reuters dispatch at the time and remain preserved in syndicated archives.

Four days later, on Oct. 18, Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit returned to Israel after more than five years in captivity in Gaza.

The political arithmetic of the agreement was extraordinary.

One Israeli soldier was exchanged for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners.

Israel released 477 prisoners during the first stage of the agreement and another 550 afterward.

That ratio did not literally establish that one Israeli human being was worth 1,027 Palestinians. Human life cannot legitimately be calculated that way.

But politically, the exchange revealed an enormous disparity in bargaining value. Reuters itself described the agreement as a “lopsided accord.”

For Palestinians, the release represented something different. Thousands of Palestinian families had relatives incarcerated in Israeli prisons, and prisoners occupied an important place in Palestinian political and national life.

The exchange followed years of negotiations mediated principally through Egypt.

Shalit had been captured on June 25, 2006, during a cross-border attack near Kerem Shalom involving fighters from Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades and allied Palestinian armed groups.

The political context also deserves clarification.


Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council election held on Jan. 25, 2006, across the Palestinian territories, including the West Bank and Gaza. For the election, Hamas fielded candidates under the electoral list known as Change and Reform, rather than appearing on the ballot simply under the Hamas name. The slate presented candidates for both the national proportional-representation seats and the individual electoral-district contests.
Change and Reform ultimately secured 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, compared with 45 for Fatah. Of Hamas’ 74 seats, 29 came through the proportional party-list vote and 45 through district races. The Palestinian Central Elections Commission certified the results, and international observers widely described the election process as competitive and generally free and fair.

Fifteen years after the Shalit exchange, however, the meaning of Israeli captivity invites a much more difficult examination.

From one captive to hundreds

On Oct. 7, 2023, fighters from several Palestinian armed organizations in Gaza crossed into southern Israel. The assault was led by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, but participants also included armed factions affiliated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other Palestinian organizations. Several of these factions had previously coordinated and trained through the Palestinian Joint Operations Room. After the initial breaches, other Palestinians also entered Israel, some apparently acting outside the organized command structures of the participating armed groups.

About 1,200 people were killed and 251 people were taken into Gaza as hostages.

Israel responded with a military campaign that transformed Gaza.

By September 2026, Gaza’s Ministry of Health reported that more than 73,000 Palestinians had been killed since Oct. 7, 2023. The figure should not be casually discounted simply because the Ministry operates within Gaza’s Hamas-governed administrative system. Gaza’s health authorities have long maintained a civil registry of deaths using hospital records, identity information and, as the medical system deteriorated during the war, additional reporting mechanisms.

The United Nations regularly attributes the figures to Gaza’s Ministry of Health rather than claiming that it has independently counted every death. That distinction, however, must be understood in context: Israel has repeatedly denied U.N. investigative bodies unrestricted access to Gaza, severely limiting their ability to conduct an independent door-to-door or forensic accounting of the dead.

Nor does the available evidence establish that the Ministry has inflated the overall toll. Independent statistical research has instead suggested that direct traumatic deaths may have been substantially undercounted during portions of the war. A peer-reviewed capture-recapture analysis estimated approximately 64,260 traumatic-injury deaths between Oct. 7, 2023 and June 30, 2024 — substantially above the number documented in the Ministry’s records for the same period.

Even that methodology cannot resolve the full human toll. Large sections of Gaza have been reduced to rubble, entire residential buildings have collapsed with families inside them, and thousands of people are still believed to remain beneath the debris. In such circumstances, the absence of a recovered body or completed death certificate cannot reasonably be equated with evidence that a person survived.

The Ministry’s published figure should therefore be understood not as a proven ceiling on Palestinian deaths, but as a documented count produced by a health system operating amid extraordinary destruction. The ultimate number of people killed — particularly when unidentified bodies, those still beneath collapsed buildings and indirect deaths from hunger, disease and the destruction of medical care are considered — may be considerably higher.

Against that devastation, the memory of the Shalit exchange raises an uncomfortable question.

What happened between 2011 and 2023 to Israel’s doctrine surrounding its captives?

In 2011, Israel accepted the release of more than one thousand Palestinian prisoners to recover one of its soldiers.

After Oct. 7, Israeli military operations were conducted while scores of Israeli captives remained somewhere inside the same territory being subjected to intensive bombardment and ground operations.

The contradiction became even more disturbing as evidence emerged about Israeli military actions on Oct. 7 itself.

The Hannibal question

For months, allegations circulated that Israeli forces had invoked principles associated with the so-called Hannibal Directive—a controversial military doctrine intended to prevent the capture of Israeli soldiers, even when the force used to prevent the abduction could endanger the captive.

Those allegations cannot simply be dismissed today as rumor.

A United Nations Commission of Inquiry found evidence that an Israeli tank crew applied the directive when it fired on a vehicle believed to be carrying abducted soldiers. The commission also found that Israeli forces likely applied Hannibal-type actions in at least two other incidents involving Israeli civilians.

In one case, the commission found that Israeli helicopter fire killed a woman as she was being abducted from Nir Oz.

In another, Israeli tank fire killed some or all of 13 Israeli civilians being held by Palestinian fighters inside a house in Kibbutz Be’eri.

The commission did not, however, substantiate every allegation associated with the directive. In particular, investigators said they could not confirm claims that Israeli helicopters indiscriminately fired on Israeli civilians and civilian vehicles at the Nova music festival.

The distinction matters.

Evidence should determine the argument—not the other way around.

Three men carrying a white flag

Then came an incident that required no speculation.

On Dec. 15, 2023, three Israeli hostages who had escaped captivity encountered Israeli troops in Shejaiya.

They were shirtless.

One carried a white flag.

Israeli soldiers opened fire.

Yotam Haim and Samer Talalka were killed. Alon Shamriz fled into a building. According to the IDF’s own investigation, he later emerged after shouting for help in Hebrew.

He, too, was shot and killed.

The Israeli military concluded that the men presented no immediate threat and acknowledged that the shootings should not have occurred.

The incident exposes the profound contradiction at the heart of the comparison.

In 2011, Israel was willing to release 1,027 Palestinians to recover one Israeli soldier alive.

Twelve years later, three Israeli captives escaped Gaza imprisonment, approached Israeli forces—one displaying the internationally recognized symbol of surrender—and were killed by the army they expected would rescue them.

These events do not prove that Israeli lives suddenly became less valuable.

But they do raise a legitimate and disturbing question about the evolution of Israeli military doctrine and the balance between defeating an enemy, preventing abduction and protecting the lives of Israel’s own captives.

And outside that calculation stands another, vastly larger human cost.

More than 73,000 Palestinians have been reported killed in Gaza since October 2023.

The lesson from 2011 therefore looks different when viewed from the ruins of Gaza.

The Shalit exchange demonstrated what governments are capable of doing when bringing a captive home becomes the overriding objective.

The years since Oct. 7 pose the inverse question:

What happens to the value of human life—Palestinian and Israeli alike—when victory becomes the overriding objective instead?

Journalist arrested by Israeli Soldiers

October 12, 2012 2 comments

Posted on October 12, 2012 by Akashma Online News
UPDATED
Nabi Saleh journalist ‘arrested in Israeli raid’
Published yesterday (updated) 12/10/2012 18:49
Source Maan News
RAMALLAH, West Bank Palestine — Israeli authorities arrested a Palestinian journalist from Ramallah area in the village of Al Nabi Saleh on Thursday and was taken to unknown location, local sources said.
“Israel Occupier Soldiers raided the home of Mohammad Atallah Al Tamimi , 24 years old, and vandalized the house before arresting the journalist, who works for the Tamimi Press Agency,” local witnesses said.
Mohammad Atallah Al Tamimi is also active with the village’s popular committee media office.
An Israeli army spokeswoman said she had no record of the incident.
The local popular committee said in a statement that it held Israeli forces responsible for the journalist’s well-being, and it condemned a series of arrests and invasions of the village’s homes, in the last 3 years they have been more than 500 incidents, that have resulted in 64 arrests.
“All these policies aim to pressure the Palestinians and kill Palestinian resistance, but we will never stop. We will keep fighting and struggling against the occupation,” the statement said.According to a Palestinian media advocacy group, Israeli forces have committed 559 violations against media freedoms in the West Bank and Gaza in the last four years.

Look that beautiful Smile, we say; “Who does not own anything, should not fear anything” 🙂 Being arrested on January 23, 2011

“Since December 2009, when An Nabi Saleh began their non-violent protests against the continued stealing of their land by the illegal Israeli colony of Halamish, more than 13% of the village’s residents – 64 people – have been arrested and jailed as of 31 March 2011.    All but three were tried for participating in the non-violent demonstrations.  Of those imprisoned, 29 have been minors under the age of 18 years and 4 have been women”  Read More on Nabi Saleh Solidarity and Resistance Committee in their Web Blogs,

“Tamimi Press have reported via Facebook: [translation via google translate]:  Tamimi Press | – Urgent – injured citizen Omar al-Tamimi, 25, more than 8 bullets metal in the side, abdomen and hands during launch indiscriminate bullets carried out by the occupation forces against the village of Nabi Saleh shortly before when storming of the village and arrested a number of citizens.  The  Popular Resistance have said Occupation Forces carry full responsibility for Tamimi life especially as it is still being held and the ambulance which are moving at a checkpoint at the entrance of the village”  September 22, 2012
Join them in their Facebook Page Tamimi Press and stay informed on the weekly Non Violent protests to raise awareness.
Intifada Media have reported: The IOF [Israeli Occupaption Forces]  invaded the village of Nabi Saleh Monday night, broke into the home of the martyr Mustafa Tamimi and arrested his brotherZiad ‘Abd al-Rizaq (25) as well as Muhammad ‘Atiyah Tamimi (28). Soldiers broke into several homes and terrorized residents. Clashes with the village’s youth ensued, and the invading army used live ammunition. One resident, ‘Ummar Tamimi, was then seriously injured by a bullet but the army detained the ambulance carrying him to Ramallah hospital, and arrested the injured and another man accompanying him. September 11, 2012

Should King Abdullah invite Netanyahu to Riyadh?


Posted on 14 September by Marivel Guzman by Original Post on 09. Sep, 2010 by Raja Mujtaba in Gaza Today

By Alan Hart

Natayahu and King Abdullah


The suggestion that he should was made by Thomas L. Friedman in his column for the New York Times on 7 September. My first response was to say to myself, “That proves Friedman doesn’t understand the complexities of the conflict and is at least a little bit bonkers.”

But the more I thought about it, the more it seemed to me that King Abdullah should do what Friedman suggested. In a moment I’ll get to what I think the Arabs and the Palestinians especially would have to gain without losing anything, but first here’s the essence what Friedman wrote.

He noted that eight years have passed since the Arab peace initiative pushed by Abdullah when he was Crown Prince was presented to, and approved by, an Arab League summit in Beirut. (It offered a full and final peace, including the normalizing of relations between the entire Arab region and Israel, in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, and a “just solution” to the Palestinian refugee problem).

Friedman then commented that the plan has been “floating out there in the ether of diplomatic possibilities” ever since its approval in 2002. “It is time to bring it out of the air. King Abdullah should invite Mr. Netanyahu to Riyadh and present it to him personally.”

Friedman went on:

“Abdullah need not go to Jerusalem, as Anwar Sadat did, or recognize Israel. He can, though, still have a huge impact on the process by simply handing his plan to the leader for whose country it was intended. I can’t think of anything that would get these peace talks off to a better start. It feels to me as though Netanyahu is taking this moment seriously, but he is still very wary. By handing him the Abdullah plan, the Saudi monarch would unleash a huge peace debate in Israel. It would make it more difficult for Netanyahu to continue settlement building – and spur an Israeli public that is also still wary to urge Netanyahu to take risks for peace and support him for doing so. Netanyahu is the only Israeli leader today who can deliver a deal.

“The Saudis can’t just keep faxing their peace initiative to Israelis. That has no emotional punch. It actually says to Israelis: if the Saudis are afraid to hand us their plan, why should we believe they’ll have the courage to implement it if we do everything they suggest? Israelis are isolated. Seeing their prime minister received by the most important Muslim leader in the world in Riyadh would have a real impact.

“Both Israelis and Palestinians are going to have to do something really hard to produce a two-state solution. Saudi officials have developed a reputation in Washington for being experts at advising everyone else about the hard things they must do, while being reluctant to step out themselves. This is their moment – to do something hard and to do something important.”

Netanyahu has apparently said that he will go anywhere for peace, so let’s suppose for the sake of discussion that King Abdullah does invite him to Riyadh and he goes.

Either at his meeting with Abdullah to take personal delivery of the Arab peace plan or afterwards, Netanyahu would say there was one element of it that was completely unacceptable to all Israelis – the proposal that a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem should be on the basis of UN Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948. Its key words are the following:

“… the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”

Down the years (and consistent with its Nakba denial), Israel has put two fingers up to Resolution 194 and denied the Palestinians a right of return, on the grounds that conceding the right would be an act of national suicide. As it was put, for example, by Likud spokesman Zalman Shoval in March 2007, “If 300,000-400,000, or maybe a million, Palestinians would invade the country, that would be the end of the state of Israel as a Jewish state.”

A truth, which all of Israel’s leaders have known for many years, is that the Palestinian right of return does not have to be an obstacle to peace unless they want it to be. Under the pragmatic Arafat’s leadership, the decision was taken to accept that in the event of a genuine and viable two-state solution, the right of return would have to be limited to the territory of the Palestinian state. Though they could not say so in public, Arafat and his leadership colleagues were completely aware this would mean that probably not more than 100,000 refugees would be able to return and that the rest would have to settle for compensation.

Another truth is that Jerusalem does not have to be an obstacle to peace unless Israel’s leaders want it to be. If they don’t want Jerusalem to be divided again, the Arabs will say, “Okay. Let it be an open, undivided city and the capital of two states.”

My point so far is that if Netanyahu did go to Riyadh, he would discover that the Arab peace plan of 2002, subject only to clarifications of the flexibility of the Arab position on the right of return and Jerusalem, actually offers what a rational Israeli government and people would accept with relief.

What would the Arabs and the Palestinians especially have to gain if King Abdullah did invite Netanyahu to Riyadh and he went?

In one scenario, and assuming that most Israelis are not beyond reason (an assumption I do not make), it might unleash what Friedman described as a “huge peace debate in Israel.” And that just might open the door to peace on terms virtually all Palestinians and most other Arabs and Muslims everywhere could just about accept.

In another scenario – continued Israeli rejection of the Arab peace plan of 2002 – it would enable King Abdullah and all of his Arab brothers at leadership level to say to the world, and America especially, something like: “Now you cannot be in any doubt about what the obstacle to peace is – Zionism. If you really want peace, you must now play your part and use the leverage you have to call and hold Zionism to account for its crimes.”

If that didn’t mobilize support in the Western world for an acceptable measure of justice for the Palestinians and peace for all, nothing ever will.

Footnote:

Some readers will say that a genuine and viable two-state solution, even if it was possible, is unacceptable because it would not provide the Palestinians with enough justice. My response is quite simple. One state for all is by far the best solution for all; but because of the reality of the existence of a nuclear-armed Zionist entity, the two-state solution is the best deal the Palestinians are ever likely to get.

Alan Hart has been engaged with events in the Middle East and their global consequences and terrifying implications – the possibility of a Clash of Civilisations, Judeo-Christian v Islamic, and, along the way, another great turning against the Jews – for nearly 40 years…

He’s been to war with the Israelis and the Arabs, but the learning experience he values most, and which he believes gave him rare insight, came from his one-to-one private conversations over the years with many leaders on both sides of the conflict. With, for example, Golda Meir, Mother Israel, and Yasser Arafat, Father Palestine. The significance of these private conversations was that they enabled him to be aware of the truth of what leaders really believed and feared as opposed to what they said in public for propaganda and myth-sustaining purposes.

It was because of his special relationships with leaders on both sides that, in 1980, he found himself sucked into the covert diplomacy of conflict resolution…Now Alan is an Institution in himself.